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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
As to the question of whether the court or the arbitrators should decide
the applicability of Section 3813 of the Education Law, there is no direct
precedent. There is a line of cases containing dicta to the effect that all issues
arising subsequent to the making of the contract should be decided by the
arbitrators, and that the only issues a court may consider is the making of a
valid contract or the failure to comply with it." In these cases the courts, desirous of upholding the intention of the parties, reason that since the parties
provided for arbitration they must have wanted all issues to be decided by
the arbitrators. However, in the instant case the Court apparently felt that
this dicta did not apply, because the question of notice is a pre-requisite to
the jurisdiction of the arbitrators.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
FOR PURPOSES OF CIVM PRACTICE AcT

§

21 A WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION

"EXISTS" AT TIhXE OF ACCMINT.

A wrongful death action was commenced on July 14, 1958, arising from
an automobile accident that occurred on March 6, 1955, allegedly due to the
negligence of defendant's intestate, who received fatal injuries and died on
the day of the accident. Three days later, on March 9, 1955, the defendant's
intestate was followed in death by plaintiff's intestate. The Appellate Division' affirmed the lower court's order granting plaintiff's motion to strike out the
defense of the Statute of Limitations. Although the wrongful death action
had not yet accrued at the time of the wrongdoer's death, the Court of Appeals,
in Gibson v. Meean,2 affirmed the Appellate Division and held that the provisions of Section 21 of the Civil Practice Act,3 which suspends the applicable
Statute of Limitations for a period of 18 months when "a person against whom
a cause of action exists" dies, applied so as to toll the two year statute.
The courts of New York have found no difficulty in applying Section
21 in those cases where the wrongdoer had died after the respective claim had
once accrued. 4 However, they have previously refused to apply it in cases
44. In re Terminal Auxillar Maritima, 6 N.Y.2d 294, 189 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1959); In re
Paloma, 3 N.Y.2d 572, 170 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958) ; In re Lipman, 289 N.Y. 76, 43 N.E.2d 817
(1942); In re Tuttman, 274 App. Div. 395, 83 N.Y.S.2d.651 (1st Dep't 1948).
1. 7 A.D.2d 986, 183 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1st Dep't 1959).
2. 7 N.Y.2d 93, 195 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1959).
3. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 21:
Effect of death of person liable: The term of 18 months after the death within
this state of a person against whom a cause of action exists, or of a person who
shall have died within 60 days after an attempt shall have been made to commence an action against him pursuant to the provision of this article, is not a
part of the time limited for the commencement of an action against his executor
or administrator.
4. Butler v. Price, 271 App. Div. 359, 65 N.Y.S.2d 688 (4th Dep't 1946); In re
McGowan's Estate, 174 Misc. 928, 22 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
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where the wrongdoer had died prior to the accrual of the action.5 In re Richman's estate, held that the section applied only to claims upon which the
general Statute of Limitations had begun to run prior to the death of the
wrongdoer. 6
This appears to be a case of first impression in the courts of New York.
To wit, is an alleged wrongdoer who dies prior to the accrual of an action of
wrongful death a "person against whom a cause of action exists" under the
provisions of Section 21 of the New York Civil Practice Act. In determining
that he is, the Court of Appeals felt that when Section 21 is read in conjunction with the 2nd paragraph of Section 118 of the Decedants Estate Law, 7
which rdcognizes the survival of a wrongdoer's potential liability for acts done
in his lifetime by preserving a cause of action against his legal representative
in a situation of this nature-i.e. when the wrongdoer predeceases his victim,
it seems abundantly clear that the Legislature intended that the cause of action
envisioned by Section 21, including an action for wrongful death, exists in
the sense that it arises from the decedant's tortious act. Therefore it appears
that in cases arising under Section 118 of the Decedant's Estate Law the New
York Court of Appeals is willing to give Section 21 a broader interpretation
than has been previously given to it by lower courts in other types of cases.
In short, the word "Iexists" as is found in Section 21 is, in those cases arising
under Section 118 of the Decedant's Estate Law, not to be interpretated as being
synonymous with the word accrues, but is to be given a true literal meaning
such as to allow for its application when the wrongdoer dies prior to the
accrual of the action.
However, by failing to articulate their view as to what interests they felt
the Legislature was attempting to protect by Section 21 (although they have
given a thorough explanation of the purpose of the 2nd paragraph of Section
118 of the New York Decedant's Estate Law), it appears that the Court has
left questions yet unanswered.
As stated in Butler v. Price, in discussing Section 21 in an action of
wrongful death where the wrongdoer had died after the accrual of the action:
"The Legislature seems to have recognized that there is inevitably a period of
time following the death of a person when it would be difficult, if not impossible, to commence an action against his estate. In order, therefore, to
prevent any hardships or loss of rights to a plaintiff under such circumstances,
5. In re Intini's Estate, Misc. -, 138 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Surr. Ct. 1954); In
Richman's Estate, 168 Misc. 834, 6 N.Y.S.2d 528 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
6. Supra note 5.
7. N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 118:
Where death oi an injury to person or property, resulting from a wrongful act,
neglect or default, occur simultaneously with or after the death of a person who
would have been liable therefore if his death had not occurred simultaneously
with such death or injury or had not intervened between the wrongful act,
neglect, or default and the resulting death or injury, an action to recover damages
for such death or injury may be maintained against the executor or administer
of such a person.

72

-

re

COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
the Legislature, by its enactment of Section 21 suspended the running of the
Statute for a period of eighteen months after the death of the person against
whom a cause of action exists." s
It seems obvious from the previous discussion that the Legislature, by its
enactment of Section 21, intended to prevent a plaintiff's cause of action from
becoming legally ineffective or burdensome by reason of the wrongdoer's death,
and such protection appears to be both reasonable and meritorious in a situation as was presented in the Butler case where there was no party in existence
for the plaintiff to sue.
However, the need for similar protection does not appear as obvious in
the present case or under similar situations which could arise under Section
118 of Decedant's Estate Law, for the wrongdoer's death, of and by itself,
could not possibly affect the legal efficacy of a cause of action which does
"exist" but which has not yet legally accrued. It is the additional fact that
letters of administration were not issued to defendant's estate until June of
1958-approximately three years after the accrual of action-that raised the
same dilemma in the present case that was presented by Butler v. Price and
cases similar to it, and to which the Legislature, by its enactment of Section
21, addressed itself. To wit, an ineffective cause of action due to the absence
of a liable legal representative to the wrongdoer's estate.
The question that faces us then is: will the courts be as willing to invoke
Section 21 as it did here in other cases arising under Section 118 of Decedant's
Estate Law where an administrator has already been appointed to the wrongdoer's estate when the action accrues? It would appear not since the reason
for invoking Section 21 would no longer exist and any such use of it (Section 21) would obviously be a windfall to plaintiff or his estate. The question, however, appears to be left open by this case. It appears the holding is
limited to cases involving Section 118 and is not an overruling of the rule
set forth in the Richnan case. 9
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL UNDER SECTION 59 (Now 388) OF THE VEHICLE AND
TRA.rnc LAW
Plaintiffs' administrators commenced the present wrongful death actions
as a result of an automobile accident on a New York highway. The car in
which the plaintiffs' intestates were killed was owned by the defendants, one
of whom had loaned the-car to other persons previous to the accident. Prior
to the instant actions, the plaintiffs had brought suit in New Hampshire against
the driver, one O'Rourke, seeking to impose liability on the insurer of the
car. The insurance policy furnished coverage to the named insured and also
to any person using the automobile with the insured's permission. In a declaratory judgment the New Hampshire court found that the limitation im8. Supra note 4 at 362, 65 N.Y.S.2d 690 (4th Dep't 1946).
9. Supra note 5.

